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Abstract
In this paper we present (to the best of our knowledge) the first outranking method to assign a score
to each alternative. It is a method of the Electre family, and we will call it Electre-Score.
Contrarily to the Multi-Attribute Value Theory methods, Electre-Score does not construct a
value function for each criterion, and then proceeds to the aggregation into a single value. It rather,
makes use of the outranking relations to make a comparison with reference sets of actions (to which
a score is assigned) and proposes a score range to each alternative, instead of a single value. This is
a more robust way of proceeding given the fragility of a single score. The sets of limiting profiles are
defined with the help of Electre Tri-nB and the reference scores are assigned to them through
the application of the deck of cards technique. The fact of being able to use outranking relations,
makes it also possible to take into account the imperfect knowledge of data and avoids systematic
compensatory effects. Some fundamental theoretical results guaranteing the consistency of the
method and an illustrative example are also provided in this paper.
Keywords: Multiple criteria analysis, Electre methods, Scoring methods, Outranking relations,
Decision support systems.
1. Introduction
Multiple criteria decision aiding (MCDA) is a discipline that comprises methods and techniques
used to produce information in order to enable decision-makers to make better and informed de-
cisions. Over the last years there was a tremendous growth in the development of new methods,
strengthening the maturity of the existing ones, and in increasing their application to deal with
real-world decision aiding situations of a crucial importance for organizations. One of the most
magnificent and wonderful features of these methods is their diversity (see Greco et al., 2016, for a
vast panoply od methods).
The three major families of methods can be divided by taking into account the form of the
results provided to the decision-makers. There are scoring based methods, which assign a score to
each action or alternative (Keeney and Raiffa, 1993), the outranking based methods that provide
one or several outranking relations between ordered pairs of alternatives and exploit such relations
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(Roy and Bouyssou, 1993), and there are also rule based approaches wich provide the decision-
makers with a set of decision rules (Greco et al., 2001).
Electre methods (Figueira et al., 2016) play a central role in the family of outranking ap-
proaches. Since their inception in the middle of the sixties of last century they were object of
several studies, extensions, generalizations, new developments, and many applications in real-world
situations. For a comprehensive survey of these methods see Govindan and Jepsen (2016). The
most relevant features of Electre methods that make them adequate to deal with several situa-
tions are the following (Figueira et al., 2013): (1) they can deal with both the quantitative and the
qualitative nature of the criteria scales; (2) the scales can be of very heterogeneous types (meters,
noisy, delay, costs, return, etc); (3) the compensatory effects are not relevant in a systematic way
(this is mainly due to the use of the concordance index and the existence of veto thresholds that
avoid some compensability); (4) they are able to take into account the imperfect knowledge of data
(uncertainty, imprecision, and ill-determination) and the arbitrariness when building the criteria;
and, finally, (5) they are very adequate to take into account the reasons for and the reasons against
an outranking.
Of course, as all the MCDA methods, the ones from Electre family are not perfect and also
suffered from some drawbacks: (1) the intransitivity phenomenon may occur (and even worse, it may
be quite frequent); (2) the phenomenon of the dependence with respect to irrelevant alternatives
may be present; (3) if all the criteria are of a quantitative nature and no imperfect knowledge and
arbitrariness are present, and in addition the decision-maker allows for a systematic compensation,
we can do better with other methods, namely the ones of Multi-Attribute Value Theory (MAVT)
family; and (4) if it is necessary assigning a score to each action, these methods are note adequate
at all.
In reality the compensation between criteria is not always allowed by decision-makers and
imperfect knowledge and arbitrariness are often present when dealing with practical decision aiding
situations. Since it will be almost impossible to avoid the two other phenomena (intransitivities
and dependence), would it be possible to build a scoring based Electre method? This is the
challenge we would like to face and the objective of this paper is thus to propose such a method.
The new method consists of following main steps:
1. Several reference sets of actions are built. We used the limiting profiles as in Electre-Tri-
nB (Ferna´ndez et al., 2017) as our reference sets. Such sets of reference actions must fulfill
some important separability conditions. Note that, whichever is the procedure to define a
priori the set of reference actions, it must satisfy a certain number of conditions that should
be as weak as possible in order the method to be fruitfully applied in a vast generality of cases.
To start, we consider rather restrictive conditions that must be relaxed as much as possible
in the following but only if these less restrictive conditions would maintain the validity of the
method.
2. With a deck of cards technique, we can assign a value to each set of limiting profiles after
choosing two reference values. This is a similar technique as the one proposed in Bottero et al.
(2018) for building interval scales.
3. The last step consists of comparing each action to the reference sets and assigning a scoring
interval to it.
It should be remarked that the nature of this scoring method is different from those belonging
to the MAVT family, since we do not consider a transformation of the scale for each criterion into
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a partial value function, and then aggregate all the partial values into a single one. The score
obtained with our procedure supplies a comprehensive evaluation without using a procedure for
converting each criterion into a value function.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is devoted to some fundamental concepts, their
definitions, and corresponding notation. Section 3 presents the new Electre-Score method,
including the conditions for the construction of the reference set, the assignment of a scoring range
to each action, and the formal definitions of the lower and upper bounds of such a range. Section
4 is related to the conditions about the set of limiting profiles that allow the procedure to be in
accordance with the objectives. Section 5 is devoted to the theoretical results proving desirable
properties of the procedure. Section 6 presents the method by means of an illustrative example
along with some practical aspects. Finally, the last section provides the main conclusions and some
lines for future research.
2. Concepts, definitions, and notation
To start we need to introduce a few notation. Let A = {a1, . . . , ai, . . . , am} denote the set of
actions to which an interval score must be assigned to each of them, G = {g1, . . . , gj , . . . , gn}
denote the set of criteria used to assess the performance of such actions, and gj(ai) denotes the
performances of action ai on criterion gj (with all the performances we can build a performance
table). Consider also the collection of sets of references actions B = {Bx1 , . . . , Bxk , . . . , Bxℓ}, for
which a score is previously defined, and let X = {x1, . . . , xk, . . . , xℓ} the set of such scores. Each
set is composed of at least one limiting profile as in Electre Tri-nB (see Ferna´ndez et al., 2017),
i.e., Bxk = {bk1, . . . , bkp, . . . , bkpk}. As part of Electre methods a credibility degree between all
ordered pairs of actions, σ(a, b), must be computed. This credibility measures on a scale [0, 1] the
degree in which action a outranks action b. In order to pass from a fuzzy relation to a crisp one, we
need to define what is called the cutting level λ ∈]0.5, 1]. A brief description of the way Electre
methods compute the degree of credibility is available in the Appendix of this paper.
The next three definitions are fundamental.
Definition 1 (Dominance). Consider two actions a and b. Action a dominates action b, whenever
gj(a) > gj(b), for all j = 1, . . . , n, with at least one strict inequality. Let a∆b denote such a binary
dominance relation.
Definition 2 (Fundamental outranking binary relation). Consider two actions a and b from set
A. Once fixed the cutting level λ, we say that action a outranks (or is at least as good as) action
b, denoted by a %λ b iff σ(a, b) > λ. It is easy to see that %λ is a reflexive, but not necessarily
symmetric and transitive binary relation. In what follows and with some abuse of the mathematical
language, we will use simply a % b instead of a %λ b for denoting this λ−outranking binary relation
(the same applies for the binary relations introduced in next definition).
Definition 3 (Derived binary relations). From the fundamental outranking binary relation %, we
can derive, for two actions a, b ∈ A, the following three binary relations (which correspond to all
possible combinations of the presence and non-presence of an outranking relation between a and b,
and b and a, respectively).
i) a ≻ b (preference in favor of a, which means that a is preferred to b) iff a % b and not(b % a);
ii) b ≻ a (preference in favor of b, which means that b is preferred to a) iff b % a and not(a % b);
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iii) a ∼ b ( indifference, which means that actions, a and b, are indifferent) iff a % b and b % a;
iv) a ‖ b ( incomparability, which means that actions, a and b, are incomparable) iff not(a % b)
and not(b % a).
(≻ is irreflexive and asymmetric; ∼ is reflexive and symmetric; and, ‖ is irreflexive and symmetric.)
Remark 1. From Definitions 2 and 3, it is easy to see that a % b implies, either a ≻ b or a ∼ b.
Taking into account the dominance relation of Definition 1, the following properties hold.
a∆b⇒ a % b (1.1)
a % b and b∆c⇒ a % c (1.2)
a∆b and b % c⇒ a % c (1.3)
a ≻ b and b∆c⇒ a ≻ c (1.4)
a∆b and b ≻ c⇒ a ≻ c (1.5)
3. Electre-Score
This section provides the basic foundations of the Electre-Score method, i.e., the necessary
elements for the construction of a reference set, the conditions needed for assigning a score range
to each action, and the formal definition of the lower and upper bounds of such a range. Most
of the material presented in this section is closely related to the Electre Tri-nB method (see
Ferna´ndez et al., 2017).
3.1. Constructing a reference set
The definition of the reference set as well as the basic assumption with respect to such reference
set are presented next. The subsection also provided some more results in the same line as in
Ferna´ndez et al. (2017).
Definition 4 (Set of reference actions). Let X = {x1, . . . , xk, . . . , xℓ} denote the set of values
considered as references scores, and Bxk = {bk1, . . . , bkp, . . . , bkpk} denote the set of reference actions
used to characterize score xk. As a result B =
⋃ℓ
k Bxk denotes a set containing all the reference
actions.
Condition 1 (Basic assumptions). The score xk is characterized by a set of reference actions,
Bxk = {bxk1, . . . , bxkp, . . . , bxkpk}, for k = 1, . . . , ℓ, such that:
i) For all bkp, bkq ∈ Bxk there is no preference between bkp and bkq (this implies, there is only
the possibility to have either bkp ∼ bkq or bkp ‖ bkq);
ii) For all bkp ∈ Bxk and bhq ∈ Bxh (xk > xh), it is not possible to have bhq ≻ bkp.
Definition 5 (Relations between an action and a reference set). Consider the following relations
between an action a, and a set of reference actions, Bxk (see Ferna´ndez et al., 2017).
i) a % Bxk iff, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , either a ‖ bkq or a % bkq, the latter relation being fulfilled by at
least one bkq ∈ Bxk (note that, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , it is not possible to have bkq ≻ a);
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ii) Bxk % a iff, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , either bkq ‖ a or bkq % a, the latter relation being fulfilled by at
least one bkq ∈ Bxk (note that, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , it is not possible to have a ≻ bkq);
iii) a ≻ Bxk iff, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , either a ‖ bkq or a ∼ bkq, or a ≻ bkq, the latter relation being
fulfilled by at least one bkq ∈ Bxk (note that, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , it is not possible to have
bkq ≻ a);
iv) Bxk ≻ a iff, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , either bkq ‖ a or bkq ∼ a, or bkq ≻ a, the latter relation being
fulfilled by at least one bkq ∈ Bxk (note that, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , it is not possible to have
a ≻ bkq);
v) a ∼ Bxk iff, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , either a ‖ bkq or a ∼ bkq, the latter relation being fulfilled by at
least one bkq ∈ Bxk (note that, since ∼ is symmetric, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , it is not possible to
have bkq ≻ a or a ≻ bkq);
vi) a ‖ Bxk iff, for all bkq ∈ Bxk , either a ‖ bkq or, when a ≻ bkq, for some bkq ∈ Bxk , bkp ≻ a,
for some bkp ∈ Bxk , with bkq 6= bkp (note that, since ∼ is symmetric, it is not possible to have
Bxk % a or a % Bxk).
Remark 2. The following implications can be derived from Definitions 1 and 5 (see Ferna´ndez et al.,
2017).
i) a ≻ Bxk implies a % Bxk ;
ii) a ≻ Bxk implies not(Bxk % a), and consequently a ≻ Bxk also implies not(Bxk ≻ a);
iii) Bxk ≻ a implies not(a % Bxk), and consequently Bxk ≻ a also implies not(a ≻ Bxk);
iv) Bxk ≻ a implies Bxk % a;
v) Bxk ≻ a and a∆b implies Bxk ≻ b;
vi) a∆b and b % Bxk implies a % Bxk;
vii) a∆b and b ≻ Bxk implies a ≻ Bxk.
3.2. Assigning a score range to each action
The aim of the ELECTRE score method we are presenting is the identification of a range, ]sl(a), su(a)[
for the score s(a) to be assigned to actions a ∈ A. Let us first discuss some conditions that guar-
antee the existence of such a range ]sl(a), su(a)[. Since we only know the relations between a and
the elements of set B (see Definition 5), the lower bound, sl(a), and the upper bound, su(a), of
the range cannot be fixed a priori. However, it is easy to see that we cannot have Bx ≻ a, for any
score x lower than or equal to the lower bound, sl(a). Otherwise, the lower bound was not properly
defined and we could move down (decrease) its value, which makes no sense. Analogously, it is easy
to see that we cannot have a ≻ Bx for any score x greater than or equal to the upper bound, s
u(a).
Otherwise, the upper bound was not properly defined and we could move up (increase) its value,
which makes no sense. This reasoning led us to establish the following two necessary conditions for
the existence of the range ]sl(a), su(a)[.
Condition 2 (Lower bound necessary condition). If x 6 sl(a), then not(Bx ≻ a), for all a ∈ A.
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Condition 3 (Upper bound necessary condition). If x > su(a), then not(a ≻ Bx), for all a ∈ A.
These two conditions are necessary for the existence of the range, but they are not sufficient,
since we know nothing about the relations between Bx and a, for an x value strictly comprised
within the range ]sl(a), su(a)[. However, it is easy to see that we cannot have Bx ≻ a, for any
score x strictly greater than the lower bound, sl(a). Otherwise, the lower bound was not properly
defined and we could move up (increase) its value, which makes no sense. Analogously, it is easy
to see that we cannot have a ≻ Bx, for any score x strictly lower than the upper bound, s
u(a).
Otherwise, the upper bound was not properly defined and we could move down (decrease) its value,
which makes no sense. This reasoning led us to establish the following two sufficient conditions for
the existence of the range ]sl(a), su(a)[.
Condition 4 (No active preference condition of reference sets in the score range). If sl(a) < x <
su(a), then not(Bx ≻ a), for all a ∈ A.
If this condition was violated, no score s(a), such that sl(a) 6 s(a) < su(a), could be justified.
Condition 5 (No passive preference condition of reference sets in the score range). If sl(a) < x <
su(a), then not(a ≻ Bx), for all a ∈ A.
Analogously, if this condition was violated, no score s(a), such that sl(a) < s(a) 6 su(a), could
be justified.
It is easy to see that Conditions 4 and 5 are fulfilled if and only if the next (equivalent) condition
holds.
Condition 6 (No preference condition of reference sets in the interval). For all possible scores, x,
such that sl(a) < x < su(a), not(Bx ≻ a) and not(a ≻ Bx), for all a ∈ A.
This condition means that assigning to action a, any feasible score, i.e, any score x such that
sl(a) < x < su(a), is only possible when, either a ∼ Bx or a ‖ Bx.
Observe that Conditions 2 and 4 can be replaced by the following condition.
Condition 7 (Lower bound general condition). If x > sl(a), then not(a ≻ Bx), for all a ∈ A.
Analogously, Conditions 3 and 5 can be replaced by the following condition.
Condition 8 (Upper bound general condition). If x < su(a), then not(Bx ≻ a), for all a ∈ A.
Remark 3. Conditions 2 to 5 do not imply by no means that the next condition is automatically
fulfilled.
Condition 9 (Indifference/incomparability). If a ∼ Bx or a ‖ Bx, then s
l(a) < x < su(a), for all
a ∈ A.
Figure 1 illustrates the above conditions. Notation [Ck] is used instead of Condition k, for
k = 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9.
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x (score)s(a)
◦ ◦
sl(a) su(a)
not(a ≻ Bx) [C3]
◦
not(Bx ≻ a) [C2]
◦
not(Bx ≻ a) [C4], not(a ≻ Bx) [C5]
[C6][C9]
not(Bx ≻ a) [C8]
◦
not(a ≻ Bx) [C7]
◦
Figure 1: Illustration of the necessary and no active and passive preference conditions for the existence of a range
for s(a), ]sl(a), su(a)[
3.3. Definitions of the lower and upper bounds
The formal definitions of the lower and upper bound are as follows.
Definition 6 (Lower bound of the score range). The sl(a) value is the highest value, such that
a ≻ Bx and not(Bx ≻ a), for all x < s
l(a).
Definition 7 (Upper bound of the score range). The su(a) value is the lowest value, such that
Bx ≻ a and not(a ≻ Bx), for all x > s
u(a).
Remark 4. It is obvious that Definitions 6 and 7 ensure that 2 and 3 are automatically fulfilled.
4. Finding the conditions on B allowing the procedure to be in accordance with the
objectives
This section presents the conditions of the set B that render the procedure or the new method
coherent, i.e., in accordance with the objectives the method have been designed for. From these
conditions a set of new results needed to be proved.
Condition 10 (Separability conditions). The following are the required separability conditions on
set B.
a Dominance based separability conditions.
a.1 Strong dominance. Consider xh > xk. For any two reference actions, bhq ∈ Bxh and
bkp ∈ Bxk , the relation bhq∆bkp holds.
a.2 Soft dominance.
a.2.p (primal): Consider xh > xk. For all bkp ∈ Bxk , there is at least one bhq ∈ Bxh such
that bhq∆bkp.
a.2.d (dual): Consider xh > xk. For all bhq ∈ Bxh, there is at least one bkp ∈ Bxk such
that bhq∆bkp.
b Preference based separability conditions.
b.1 Strong preference. For any two reference actions, bhq ∈ Bxh and bkp ∈ Bxk , the relation
bhq ≻ bkp holds.
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b.2 Soft preference.
b.2.p (primal): Consider xh > xk. For all bkp ∈ Bxk , there is at least one bhq ∈ Bxh such
that bhq ≻ bkp.
b.2.d (dual): Consider xh > xk. For all bhq ∈ Bxh, there is at least one bkp ∈ Bxk such
that bhq ≻ bkp.
Proposition 1 (Comparisons of the actions against reference sets).
i) If the primal soft dominance separability condition holds for B, then, for all a ∈ A, a % Bxk
implies not(Bxh ≻ a), for all xh < xk;
ii) If the primal soft dominance separability condition holds for B, then, for all a ∈ A, Bxk ≻ a
implies not(a % Bxh), for all xh > xk;
iii) If both the primal and the dual soft dominance separability condition hold for B, then, for all
a ∈ A, a % Bxk implies (a % Bxh), for all xh < xk;
iv) If both the primal and the dual soft dominance separability condition hold for B, then, for all
a ∈ A, Bxk ≻ a implies (Bxh ≻ a), for all xh > xk;
v) If the dual soft dominance separability condition holds for B, then, for all bkp ∈ Bxk , bkp %
Bxh, for all xh 6 xk;
vi) If the primal soft dominance separability condition holds for B, then, for all bkp ∈ Bxk ,
Bxh ≻ bkp, for all xh > xk.
Proof. We shall prove only point iv) and vi) that will be used several times in the proofs of other
propositions in the paper. The other points have similar proofs. Analogous results have been
obtained with respect to sorting procedures in (Ferna´ndez et al., 2017).
If Bxh ≻ a then there exist bhp ∈ Bxh such that bhp ≻ a. Since k > h, by Condition a.2.p
(primal), there exist bkq ∈ Bxk such that bkq∆bhp and, consequently, bkq ≻ a. By contradiction,
let us suppose that there exist bkr ∈ Bxk such that a ≻ bkr. By Condition a.2.d (dual), there
should exist bhs ∈ Bxh , such that bkr∆bhs. Therefore we would get a ≻ bhs, which would imply not
(Bxh ≻ a) contradicting the hypothesis Bxh ≻ a. This concludes the proof of point iv).
If a ≻ Bxh then there exist bhp ∈ Bxh such that a ≻ bhp. Since h > k, by Condition a.2.d
(dual), there exist bkq ∈ Bxk such that bhp∆bkq and, consequently, a ≻ bkq. By contradiction,
let us suppose that there exist bkr ∈ Bxk such that bkr ≻ a. By Condition a.2.p (primal), there
should exist bhs ∈ Bxh , such that bhs∆bkr. Therefore we would get bhs ≻ a, which would imply not
(a ≻ Bxh) contradicting the hypothesis a ≻ Bxh . This concludes the proof of point vi).
Proposition 2 (Upper and lower bound sufficiency). If B fulfills both the primal and the dual
soft dominance separability conditions (see Condition 10, points a.2.p and a.2.d), then Conditions
4 and 5 are also fulfilled.
Proof. By contradiction, suppose that there exist xh ∈ X and a ∈ A such that xh < s
u(a) and
Bxh ≻ a. By Definition 7, this would imply that there should exist xk > xh such that a ≻ Bxk .
Thus, there would exist bkp ∈ Bxk such that a ≻ bkp. By Condition a.2.p (primal), there should
exist bhq ∈ Bxh such that bkp∆bhq. Consequently, a ≻ bhq, which would imply not(Bxh ≻ a),
contradicting thus the hypothesis Bxh ≻ a. Therefore, Condition 4 holds.
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Analogously, by contradiction, suppose that there exists xh ∈ X and a ∈ A such that xh > s
l(a)
and a ≻ Bxh . By Definition 6, this would imply that there should exist xk < xh such that Bxk ≻ a.
Thus, there would exist bkp ∈ Bxk such that bkp ≻ a. By Condition a.2.d (dual), there should
exist bhq ∈ Bxh such that bhq∆bkp. Consequently, bhq ≻ a which would imply not(a ≻ Bxh),
contradicting thus the hypothesis a ≻ Bxh . Therefore, Condition 5 holds.
Proposition 3 (Implications of soft dominance in a preference of an action w.r.t. a set). If B
fulfills both the primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Points a.2.p and
a.2.d of Condition 10), then, for any a ∈ A, a ≻ Bx for all x 6 s
l(a).
Proof. By Definition 6, we have a ≻ Bsl(a), and, since Points a.2.p and a.2.d (primal and dual) of
Condition 10 hold, by Proposition 1, we obtain a ≻ Bx, for all x < s
l(a).
Proposition 4 (Implications of soft dominance in a preference of a set w.r.t. an action). If B
fulfills both the primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Points a.2.p and
a.2.d of condition 10), then, for any a ∈ A, Bx ≻ a for all x > s
u(a).
Proof. By Definition 7, we have Bsu(a) ≻ a and, since Points a.2.p and a.2.d (primal and dual) of
Condition 10 hold, by Proposition 1, we obtain Bx ≻ a, for all x > s
u(a).
Proposition 5 (Implications of soft dominance in the indifference/incomparability region). If B
fulfills both the primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Condition 10, points
a.2.p and a.2.d), then Conditions 9 is fulfilled. Moreover, in such a case, the value su(a) is simply
the highest value, such that a ≻ Bx, for x < s
u(a), and sl(a) is the lowest value, such that Bx ≻ a,
for x > sl(a), for all a ∈ A (i.e., the second parts of Definitions 6 and 7 can be neglected since they
are automatically fulfilled by themselves)
Proof. We have already noted that Conditions 4 and 5 are equivalent to Condition 6, in which,
for all a ∈ A and, for all values x such that sl(a) < x < su(a), not(Bx ≻ a) and not(a ≻ Bx).
Therefore, we have to prove only that if Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10 are satisfied, then
for all values x such that not(Bx ≻ a) and not(a ≻ Bx), we have s
l(a) < x < su(a). This is true
because
– by Proposition 3, if x 6 sl(a), then a ≻ Bx; and,
– by Proposition 4, if x > su(a), then Bx ≻ a.
Consequently, we obtain that, under the same conditions, sl(a) is simply the highest value x such
that a ≻ Bx, and, s
u(a) is simply the lowest value x such that Bx ≻ a.
5. Theoretical results
This section has the purpose of showing the consistency of the method with respect to some funda-
mental and quite natural requirements, namely the ones of uniqueness, independence, monotonicity,
conformity, homogeneity, and stability.
Definition 8 (Inserting and deleting operations). The following two operations are considered:
i) Inserting operation:
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i.a) a new set Bx is inserted in B;
i.b) a new action b is inserted in Bx.
ii) Deleting operation.
ii.a) a set Bx is removed from B;
ii.b) an action b is removed from Bx.
Definition 9 (Structural requirements). The following structural requirements of the method are
considered:
i) Uniqueness. For each action a ∈ A there is a single value sl(a) and a single value su(a).
ii) Independence. The definition of the values sl(a) and su(a), for action a ∈ A, does not depend
on the other actions in A \ {a}.
iii) Monotonicity. If a∆a′, then sl(a) > sl(a′) and su(a) > su(a′).
iv) Conformity. If a ∈ Bxk , then s
l(a) = xk−1 and s
u(a) = xk+1.
v) Homogeneity. If two actions, a and a′, compare the same way with respect to the reference
actions in B, then sl(a) = sl(a′) and su(a) = su(a′).
vi) Stability. For a ∈ A with xr = s
l(a) < su(a) = xs, let s
∗l(a) and s∗u(a) be the new bounds in
consequence of one of the operations of Definition 8. Then
xr−1 6 s
∗l(a) 6 xr+1
and
xs−1 6 s
∗u(a) 6 xs+1.
The latter requirement means that single inserting or deleting operations according to Definition
8 imply a minimal perturbation on the score range of each action.
Note that uniqueness, independence, monotonicity and homogeneity are clearly satisfied. We
only focus our attention on conformity and stability.
Theorem 1 (Conformity). If B fulfills both the primal and the dual soft dominance and prefer-
ence separability conditions (see Points a.2.p, a.2.d, b.2.p, and b.2.d of Condition 10,), then the
conformity property of Definition 9 is fulfilled.
Proof. By Points b.2.p and b.2.d of Condition 10, for each a ∈ Bxk there exists bk−1p ∈ Bxk−1 , such
that
a ≻ bk−1p (2)
and bk+1q ∈ Bxk+1 , such that
bk+1q ≻ a. (3)
By contradiction, let us suppose that there exists bk−1r ∈ Bxk−1 , such that
bk−1r ≻ a. (4)
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By Point a.2.p of Condition 10, there would exist bks ∈ Bxk such that bks∆bk−1r that, together
with (4), would imply bks ≻ a, which is impossible because we cannot have a limiting profile of
a class preferred to another limiting profile of the same class. Consequently, there cannot be any
profile from Bxk−1 preferred to bks which, together with (2), implies that
a ≻ Bxk−1 . (5)
Again, by contradiction, let us suppose that there exists bk+1t ∈ Bxk+1 , such that
a ≻ bk+1t. (6)
By Point b.2.d of Condition 10, there would exist bku ∈ Bxk such that bk+1t∆bku that, together
with (6) would imply a ≻ bku, which is impossible because we cannot have a limiting profile of a
class preferred to another limiting profile of the same class. Consequently, a cannot be preferred
to any profile from Bxk+1 , which, together with (3), implies that
Bxk+1 ≻ a. (7)
Based on the above considerations and taking any a ∈ Bk, we can say that
– due to (1) and (5) for any xh < xk,
a ≻ Bxh , (8)
– from Point i) of Condition 1,
not(a ≻ Bxk) and not(Bxk ≻ a), (9)
– due to (1) and (7) for any xh > xk,
Bxh ≻ a. (10)
Therefore,
◦ k − 1 is the maximum value of h, for which a ≻ Bxh and, consequently, by Proposition
5, sl(a) = xk−1,
◦ k + 1 is the minimum value of h, for which, Bxh ≻ a and, consequently, by Proposition
5, su(a) = xk+1.
Lemma 1 (Inserting a reference set: consequences w.r.t. lower bound). If B fulfills both the primal
and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10)
and if a set of limiting profiles Bx is inserted in B in such a way that these conditions are still
fulfilled, and sl(a) = xs we have either
xs < s
l∗(a) = x < xs+1
or
sl∗(a) = sl(a).
Moreover, sl∗(a) = x if and only if
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– xs < x < xs+1; and.
– a ≻ Bx.
Proof. If a set Bx is added we can have the following cases:
1. x < sl(a): in this case, by Proposition 3, we obtain a ≻ Bx. Consequently, the highest value z
from X ∪{x} such that a ≻ Bz is again s
l(a), which, by Proposition 5, implies sl∗(a) = sl(a);
2. sl(a) = xs < x < xs+1 and not(a ≻ Bx): also in this case the maximal value z from X ∪ {x}
such that a ≻ Bz is s
l(a), which, again by Proposition 5, implies sl∗(a) = sl(a);
3. sl(a) = xs < x < xs+1 and a ≻ Bx: in this case the highest value z from X ∪ {x}, such that,
a ≻ Bz is x, which, again by Proposition 5, implies s
l∗(a) = x;
4. sl(a) = xs < xs+1 < x: in this case we cannot have a ≻ Bx because from Condition 7 (that
is, by the joint consideration of Conditions 2 and 4) not(a ≻ Bxs+1), but, by Proposition 1,
a ≻ Bx would imply a ≻ Bxs+1 .
Lemma 2 (Inserting a reference set: consequences for the upper bound). If B fulfills both the
primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition
10), and if a set of limiting profiles Bx is inserted in B in such a way that these conditions are still
fulfilled, and su(a) = xt we have either
xt−1 < s
u∗(a) = x < xt
or
su∗(a) = su(a).
Moreover, su∗(a) = x if and only if
– xt−1 < x < xt; and,
– Bx ≻ a.
Proof. If a set Bx is added we can have the following cases:
1. x > su(a): in this case, by Proposition 3, we obtain Bx ≻ a. Consequently, the lowest
value z from X ∪ {x} such that Bz ≻ a is again s
u(a), which, from Proposition 5, implies
su∗(a) = su(a);
2. su(a) = xt > x > xt−1 and not(Bx ≻ a): also in this case the lowest value z from X ∪ {x}
such that Bz ≻ a is s
u(a), which, again by Proposition 5, implies su∗(a) = su(a);
3. su(a) = xt > x > xt−1 and Bx ≻ a: in this case the lowest value z from X ∪ {x}, such that,
Bz ≻ a is x, which, again by Proposition 5, implies s
u∗(a) = x;
4. su(a) = xt > xt−1 > x: in this case one cannot have Bx ≻ a because by Condition 8 (that
is, by the joint consideration of Conditions 3 and 5) not(Bxt−1 ≻ a), but, by Proposition 1,
Bx ≻ a would imply Bxt−1 ≻ a.
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Remark 5 (Deleting a reference set). If both the primal and the dual soft dominance separability
conditions (see Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10) hold for B and a set of limiting profiles Bx
is deleted from B, clearly the primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions continue
to be fulfilled.
Lemma 3 (Deleting a reference set: consequences w.r.t. lower bound). If B fulfills both the primal
and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10), a
set of limiting profiles Bx is removed from B, and s
l(a) = xs, then
– sl(a) = xs = x and s
l∗(a) = xs−1; or
– sl(a) = xs 6= x and s
l∗(a) = sl(a).
Proof. According to Remark 5, Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10 hold also after Bx is removed
from B. Consequently, from Proposition 5, sl∗(a) continues to be the highest value z ∈ X \ {x}
such that a ≻ Bz. We can have two cases
sl(a) = xs = x: remember from Proposition 3, that the highest value z ∈ X \ {x} such that
a ≻ Bz becomes xs−1 and, consequently, s
l∗(a) = xs−1;
sl(a) = xs 6= x: the highest value z ∈ X \ {x} such that a ≻ Bz continues to be xs and,
consequently, sl∗(a) = sl(a) = xs.
Lemma 4 (Deleting a reference set: consequences w.r.t. upper bound). If B fulfills both the primal
and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10), a
set of limiting profiles Bx is removed from B, and s
u(a) = xt, then
– su(a) = xt = x and s
u∗(a) = xt+1; or,
– su(a) = xt 6= x and s
u∗(a) = su(a).
Proof. Remember that from Remark 5, Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10 hold also after Bx
is removed from B, and, taking into account Proposition 5, su∗(a) continues to be the lowest value
z ∈ X \ {x} such that Bz ≻ a. We can have two cases:
1. su(a) = xt = x: remember that from Proposition 4, the lowest value z ∈ X \ {x} such that
Bz ≻ a becomes xt+1 and, consequently, s
u∗(a) = xt+1;
2. su(a) = xt 6= x: the lowest value z ∈ X \ {x} such that Bz ≻ a continues to be xt and,
consequently, su∗(a) = su(a) = xt.
Lemma 5 (Inserting a reference action: consequences w.r.t. lower bound). If B fulfills both the
primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition
10), and if a limiting profile bkp is added to Bxk in such a way that these conditions are still fulfilled,
and sl(a) = xs, then
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– sl∗(a) = xs−1 if and only if bkp ≻ a and s
l(a) = xs = xk;
– sl∗(a) = xs+1, if and only if a ≻ bkp, xk = xs+1 and there is no bs+1q ∈ Bxs+1 such that
bs+1q ≻ a;
– sl∗(a) = sl(a), otherwise.
Proof. If bkp ≻ a and s
l(a) = xs = xk, after adding bkp,we have not(a ≻ Bxs). Consequently,
taking into consideration Proposition 3, the highest value z such that a ≻ Bz becomes xs−1, so
that sl∗(a) = xs−1.
If a ≻ bkp, xk = xs+1 and there is no other bkq ∈ Bxs+1 such that bkq ≻ a, after adding bkp, we
have a ≻ Bxs+1 . In this case, the highest value z such that a ≻ Bz is no more xs and it becomes
xs+1, in such a way that, according to Proposition 5, we obtain s
l∗(a) = xs+1.
All the other possible cases are the following:
1. xk < s
l(a): since a ≻ Bsl(a) and after adding bkp, Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10 are
still satisfied, then the highest z such that a ≻ Bz remains s
l(a), which, from Proposition 5,
leads to sl∗(a) = sl(a);
2. xk = s
l(a), but non(bkp ≻ a): in this case, after adding the limiting profile bkp, we continue
to have a ≻ Bxk , in such a way that the highest z such that a ≻ Bz remains s
l(a), which,
from Proposition 5, leads to sl∗(a) = sl(a);
3. xk = xs+1, but not(a ≻ bkp) or there is at least one bkq ∈ Bxs+1 , such that, bkq ≻ a: in this
case, after adding the reference action bkp, we continue to have not(a ≻ Bxs+1), in such a
way that the highest z, such that, a ≻ Bz remains s
l(a), which, from Proposition 5, leads to
sl∗(a) = sl(a);
4. xk > xs+1: since not(a ≻ Bxs+1) and since after adding bkp, Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition
10 are still satisfied, then, from Proposition 1, we obtain not(a ≻ Bxk), in such a way that
the highets z such that a ≻ Bz remains s
l(a) which, by Proposition 5, leads to sl∗(a) = sl(a).
Lemma 6 (Inserting a reference action: consequences w.r.t. upper bound). If B fulfills both the
primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition
10), and if a limiting profile bkp is added to Bxk in such a way that these conditions are still fulfilled,
and su(a) = xt, then
– su∗(a) = xt+1, if a ≻ bkp and s
u(a) = xt = xk;
– su∗(a) = xt−1, if bkp ≻ a, xk = xt−1 and there is no bkq ∈ Bxt−1 such that a ≻ bkq;
– su∗(a) = su(a), otherwise.
Proof. If a ≻ bkp and s
u(a) = xt = xk, then, after adding bkp, we have not(Bxk ≻ a). Consequently,
taking into consideration Proposition 3, the lowest value z such that Bz ≻ a becomes xt+1, in such
a way that su∗(a) = xt+1.
If bkp ≻ a, xk = xt−1 and there is no other bkq ∈ Bxt−1 such that a ≻ bkq, after adding bkp, we
have Bxt−1 ≻ a. In this case, the lowest value z such that Bz ≻ a is no more xt and it becomes
xt−1, in such a way that, according to Proposition 5, we obtain s
u∗(a) = xt−1.
All the other possible cases are the following:
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1. xk > s
u(a): since Bsu(a) ≻ a and after adding bkp, Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10 are
still satisfied, the lowest z such that Bz ≻ a remains s
u(a), which, by Proposition 5, leads to
su∗(a) = su(a);
2. xk = s
u(a), but not(a ≻ bkp): in this case, after adding the reference action bkp, we continue
to have Bxk ≻ a, in such a way that the lowest z such that Bz ≻ a remains s
u(a), which, by
Proposition 5, leads to su∗(a) = su(a);
3. xk = xt−1, but not(bkp ≻ a) or there is at least one bkq ∈ Bxt−1 such that a ≻ bkq: in this
case, after adding the reference action bkp, we continue to have not(Bxt−1 ≻ a), in such a
way that the lowest z such that Bz ≻ a remains s
u(a), which, by Proposition 5, leads to
su∗(a) = su(a);
4. xk < xt−1: since not(Bxt−1 ≻ a) and since after adding bkp Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition
10 are still satisfied, then, by Proposition 1, we obtain not(Bxk ≻ a), in such a way that the
lowest z such that Bz ≻ a remains s
u(a), which, by Proposition 5, leads to su∗(a) = su(a).
Lemma 7 (Deleting a reference action: consequences w.r.t. lower bound). If B fulfills both the
primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition
10), and if a limiting profile bkp is removed from Bxk , in such a way that, these conditions are still
fulfilled, and sl(a) = xs, then
– sl∗(a) = xs−1, if s
l(a) = xk, a ≻ bkp and there is no other bkq ∈ Bxk such that a ≻ bkq,
– sl∗(a) = xs+1, if bkp ≻ a, xk = xs+1, there is no other bkq ∈ Bxs+1 such that bkq ≻ a and
there exists at least one reference action bkr ∈ Bxs+1 such that a ≻ bkr;
– sl∗(a) = sl(a), otherwise.
Proof. If sl(a) = xk, a ≻ bkp and there is no other bkq ∈ Bxk such that a ≻ bkq, then after bkp is
removed we have not(a ≻ Bxk). Consequently, taking into consideration Proposition 3, the highest
value z such that a ≻ Bz becomes xs−1, in such a way that s
l∗(a) = xs−1.
If bkp ≻ a, xk = xs+1, there is no other bkq ∈ Bxs+1 such that bkq ≻ a and there exists at least
one limiting profile bkr ∈ Bxs+1 such that a ≻ bkr, after removing bkp we have a ≻ Bxs+1 , in such
a way that the highest z such that a ≻ Bz becomes xs+1 and, consequently, from Proposition 5,
sl∗(a) = xs+1.
All the other possible cases are the following:
1. xk < s
l(a): since after removing bkp the highest z such that a ≻ Bz remains s
l(a) and Points
a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10 are still satisfied, by Proposition 5, we obtain sl∗(a) = sl(a);
2. xk = s
l(a), and not(a ≻ bkp) or there is at least another bkq ∈ Bxk such that a ≻ bkq: in this
case, after removing the limiting profile bkp, we continue to have a ≻ Bsl(a), and, therefore,
sl∗(a) = sl(a);
3. xk = xs+1, but not(bkp ≻ a) or there is at least another bkq ∈ Bxs+1 such that bkq ≻ a or
there does not exist any reference action bkr ∈ Bxs+1 such that a ≻ bkr: in this case, after
removing the limiting profile bkp, we continue to have not(a ≻ Bxs+1), in such a way that the
highest z such that Bz ≻ a remains s
l(a), which gives sl∗(a) = sl(a);
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4. xk > xs+1: since not(a ≻ Bxs+1) and since after removing bkp Points a.2.p and a.2.d of
Condition 10 are still satisfied, then, by Proposition 1 we obtain not(a ≻ Bxk), in such a way
that the highest z such that a ≻ Bz remains s
l(a), which leads to sl∗(a) = sl(a).
Lemma 8 (Deleting a reference action: consequences w.r.t. upper bound). If B fulfills both the
primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions (see Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition
10) and if a limiting profile bkp is removed from Bxk in such a way that these conditions are still
fulfilled, and su(a) = xt, then
– su∗(a) = xt+1, if s
u(a) = xk, bkp ≻ a and there is no other bkq ∈ Bxk such that bkq ≻ a,
– su∗(a) = xt−1, if a ≻ bkp, xk = xt−1, there is no bkq ∈ Bxt−1 such that a ≻ bkq and there is at
least one reference action bkr ∈ Bxt−1 such that bkr ≻ a;
– sl∗(a) = su(a), otherwise.
Proof. If su(a) = xk, bkp ≻ a and there is no other bkq ∈ Bxk such that bkq ≻ a, then after bkp is
removed one has non(Bxk ≻ a). Consequently, taking into consideration Proposition 3, the lowest
value z such that Bz ≻ a becomes xt+1, in such a way that s
u∗(a) = xt+1.
If a ≻ bkp, xk = xt−1, there is no other bkq ∈ Bxt−1 such that a ≻ bkq and there is at least
one limiting profile bkr ∈ Bxt−1 such that bkr ≻ a, after removing bkp one has Bxt−1 ≻ a, in such
a way that the lowest z such that a ≻ Bz becomes xt−1 and, consequently, from Proposition 5,
su∗(a) = xt−1.
All the other possible cases are the following:
1. xk > s
u(a): since after removing bkp the lowest z such that Bz ≻ a remains s
u(a) and Points
a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10 are still satisfied, by Proposition 5, we obtain su∗(a) = su(a);
2. xk = s
u(a), and not(bkp ≻ a) or there is at least another bkq ∈ Bxk such that bkq ≻ a: in this
case, after removing the reference action bkp, we continue to have Bsu(a) ≻ a, and, therefore,
su∗(a) = su(a);
3. xk = xt−1, but not(a ≻ bkp) or there is at least another bkq ∈ Bxt−1 such that a ≻ bkq, or
there does not exist any reference action bkr ∈ Bxt−1 such that bkr ≻ a: in this case, after
removing the reference action bkp, we continue to have not(Bxt−1 ≻ a), in such a way that
the lowest z such that Bz ≻ a remains s
u(a), which leads to su∗(a) = su(a);
4. xk < xt−1: since not(Bxt−1 ≻ a) and since after removing bkp Points a.2.p and a.2.d of
Condition 10 are still satisfied, then, by Proposition 1, we obtain not(Bxk ≻ a), in such a way
that the lowest z, such, that Bz ≻ a remains s
u(a), which leads to su∗(a) = su(a).
Putting together the results of Lemmas 1-8 we get the following general result.
Theorem 2 (Stability). If B fulfills both the primal and the dual soft dominance separability
conditions (see Points a.2.p and a.2.d of Condition 10) then the stability condition holds.
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6. Practical issues and an illustrative example
This section presents some practical aspects of the method and an illustrative example
6.1. Building the set of reference actions
Let us start by observing that in defining the collection of sets of references actions
B = {Bx1 , . . . , Bxk , . . . , Bxℓ}
it is necessary to take care that all actions a from A the following condition is satisfied
Bxℓ ≻ a ≻ Bx1 . (11)
Condition (11) permits to compare all actions a from A with sets Bx of reference actions, so that
a range ]sl(a), su(a)[ for the score s(a) is assigned to each a ∈ A.
There are different ways of building the set of reference actions. Next we present two different ones.
Direct method. We ask the decision-maker to propose a set of reference actions that are used to
characterize some scoring levels, for example, 20, 40, 60, and 80. Several reference actions can be
proposed a priori to characterize the same scoring level. We assume that the scales are bounded
from below and from above in such a way that we can consider reference the actions b0 and b100,
characterizing the scores of 0 and 100 with actions having, on each considered criterion, the lower
bound performances and the upper bound performances, respectively.
A deck of cards based technique. We can also ask the decision-maker to propose a set of actions to be
taken as reference actions and use the deck of cads method in a similar way as in Figueira and Roy
(2002). These actions must be ordered from the worst to the best, with the possibility of some ties.
The decision-maker is required to put some blank cards between these equivalent sets of reference
actions in order to assign a score to each equivalence class, on the basis of the extreme scores 0 and
100. The scores thus obtained are not necessarily equally spaced. It should be noticed that other
values different from 0 and 100 can be used (this is also true when using the previous method).
6.2. The method
The method is now presented in a very simple way. Remember that in order to assign a score s(a)
to the action a ∈ A, we should firstly choose a λ cutting level to transform the fuzzy outranking
relation into a crispy one.
1. Find the set of reference actions, Bx, with the highest score x, such that a ≻ Bx and, for all
x′ < x, we have either a ≻ Bx′ or a ‖ Bx′ . It is then natural to consider a score s(a) such that
s(a) > x = sl(a), and indeed, according Definition 6, we have sl(a) = x. Let us remember also
that by Proposition 5, if both the primal and the dual soft dominance separability conditions
(see Condition 10, points a.2.p and a.2.d) hold, then sl(a) is simply the highest value, such
that a ≻ Bx.
2. Find the set of reference actions, Bx, with the lowest score x, such that Bx ≻ a and, for
all x′ > x, we have either Bx′ ≻ a or a ‖ Bx′ . It is then natural to consider a score s(a)
such that s(a) < x = su(a), and indeed, according Definition 7, we have su(a) = x. Let
us remember also that by Proposition 5, if both the primal and the dual soft dominance
separability conditions (see Condition 10, points a.2.p and a.2.d) hold, then su(a) is simply
the lowest value, such that Bx ≻ a.
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6.3. Illustrative example
We consider the example in Figueira et al. (2009) regarding the evaluation of some sites for the
location of a new hotel. The set of criteria is as follows:
1. Investment costs (Scale unit: Ke; Code: ICOST; notation: g1; preference direction: mini-
mization). This criterion comprises the land purchasing costs as well as the costs for building
the new hotel.
2. Annual costs (Scale unit: Ke; Code: ACOST; notation: g2; preference direction: minimiza-
tion). This criterion comprises the hotel operating costs.
3. Recruitment (Scale unit: verbal levels (seven); Code: RECRU; notation: g3; preference direc-
tion: maximization). This criterion models the possibility of recruiting workers.
4. Image (Scale unit: verbal levels (seven); Code: IMAGE; notation: g4; preference direction:
maximization). This criterion models the perceptions of the clients about the district where
the new hotel will be located.
5. Access (Scale unit: verbal levels (seven); Code: ACCES; notation: g5; preference direction:
maximization). This criterion models the possibility of recruiting workers.
The verbal scale used for the last three criteria comprises the following levels (in between paren-
thesis we used a numerical code for each level): very bad[1]; bad[2]; rather bad[3]; average[4];
rather good[5]; good[6]; very good[7].
There are five potential sites for the location of the new hotel. The performance table can be
presented as follows (Table 1).
a ICOST (g1) ACOST (g2) RECRU (g3) IMAGE (g4) ACCES (g5)
a1 13 000 3 000 4 4 4
a2 15 000 2 500 6 2 7
a3 10 900 3 400 6 6 1
a4 15 500 3 500 6 6 6
a5 15 000 2 600 6 1 2
Table 1: Performance table
The weights, discriminating (indifference and preference) thresholds used in the method are the
following (see Table 2). Let us consider an ordered pair of actions (a, b) ∈ A×A. The performance
of b is assumed to be worse than the performance of a. This means that the variable thresholds
presented in the next table with respect to criteria g1 and g2 are direct variable thresholds (see
Roy et al., 2014). For the sake of simplicity, no veto thresholds are considered in this example. For
the remaining criteria the thresholds are constant (the numbers represent the differences of levels,
not the scale levels. Thus, the indifference threshold is a difference of one performance level, while
the preference threshold corresponds to a difference of two performance levels).
Our set of limiting profiles is composed of seven subsets, i.e., B = {Bx1 , Bx2 , Bx3 , Bx4 , Bx5 , Bx6 ,
Bx7}. This means that will be defined seven reference values X = {x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7}. These
values were obtained with the deck of cards method proposed in Bottero et al. (2018) to build
interval scales, by fixing two reference levels. In this work, and without loss of generality, we will
put x1 = 0 and x7 = 100.
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Parameters ICOST (g1) ACOST (g2) RECRU (g3) IMAGE (g4) ACCES (g5)
kj 5 4 3 3 3
qj(gj(b)) 250 + 0.03g1(b) 50 + 0.05g2(b) 1 1 1
pj(gj(b)) 500 + 0.05g1(b) 100 + 0.07g2(b) 2 2 2
Table 2: Parameters table
The B sets are characterized by at least a single limiting profile as follows.
Bx1=0 = {b11 = (18 000, 4 000, 1, 1, 1)};
Bx2 = {b21 = (17 000, 3 500, 2, 2, 1), b22 = (16 500, 3 700, 1, 2, 1)};
Bx3 = {b31 = (15 350, 3 200, 3, 1, 2)};
Bx4 = {b41 = (14 250, 2 850, 3, 4, 3), b42 = (13 750, 3 150, 4, 3, 3)};
Bx5 = {b51 = (12 650, 2 650, 4, 4, 5)};
Bx6 = {b61 = (11 500, 2 100, 5, 6, 5), b62 = (11 000, 2 500, 6, 5, 7)};
Bx7=100 = {b71 = (10 000, 2 000, 7, 7, 7)};
The deck of cards method applied to this problem works as follows.
1. The subsets of reference profiles are totally ordered as follows (≺ means “strictly less preferred
than”):
Bx1 ≺ Bx2 ≺ Bx3 ≺ Bx4 ≺ Bx5 ≺ Bx6 ≺ Bx7 .
2. We then call the attention of the decision-maker to the fact that if the difference between
two consecutive sets is bigger than the difference of other pair of consecutive subsets, she/he
should add more blank cards in the first two consecutive ones than in the second ones (for
more details see Bottero et al., 2018). We may obtain the following ranking of the subsets
with the blank cards in between consecutive ones (in brackets):
Bx1 [1] Bx2 [2] Bx3 [0] Bx4 [1] Bx5 [0] Bx6 [2] Bx7 .
Zero blank cards between two consecutive sets of limiting profiles does not mean that the
limiting profiles of the two consecutive sets have the same value, but only that the difference
is minimal. We know that the number of units between Bx1 and Bx7 is α = (1 + 1) + (2 +
1) + (0 + 1) + (1 + 1) + (0 + 1) + (2 + 1) = 12.
3. In this step we should define the two reference levels. As stated before, we considered that
the value of all the limiting profiles in Bx1 is 0, i.e., x1 = 0 and that the value of all the
limiting profiles in Bx7 is 100, i.e., x7 = 100.
4. Consequently, we can compute the value of the unit as follows.
u =
x7 − x1
h
=
100 − 0
12
= 8.333333.
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5. The computations of the remaining values in X is easy since we know the number of units
separating two consecutive sets of limiting profiles. We have thus,
x1 = 0, x2 = 25, x3 = 33.33333333, x4 = 50, x5 = 58.33333333, x6 = 83.33333333, x7 = 100.
Let us consider now the comparison table of all of our five sites against the limiting profiles
(Table 3).
b a1 ≻ b a2 ≻ b a3 ≻ b a4 ≻ b a5 ≻ b b ≻ a1 b ≻ a2 b ≻ a4 b ≻ a4 b ≻ a5
b11 ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻
b21 ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻
b22 ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻
b31 ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻
b41 ≻ ≻ ≻
b42 ≻ ≻
b51 ≻ ≻
b61 ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻
b62 ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻
b71 ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻ ≻
Table 3: Comparison table
Now, for the definition of the score range of each alternative we can take advantage of this
table. Let us consider action a1 and try to identify s
l(a1) < s(a) < s
u(a1). As for the lower bound
it is provided by x3 and the upper bound by x6. Thus, the range for score of a1 becomes.
33.33333 < s(a1) < 83.33333.
With the same procedure we can derive the range for all the five actions:
33.33333 < s(a1) < 83.33333;
50.00000 < s(a2) < 83.33333;
50.00000 < s(a3) < 83.33333;
33.33333 < s(a4) < 58.33333;
33.33333 < s(a5) < 58.33333;
7. Conclusions
In this paper we presented a new method for assigning a score range to each action. In this
sense it can provide a more robust conclusion about the possible scores such an action can have.
The theoretical soundness of the method has been proved, i.e., the fundamental requirements
of uniqueness, independence, monotonicity, conformity, homogeneity, and stability with respect to
insertion and deletion operations, became properties of the method, which provide some consistency
to the method.
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All the main strengths of Electre methods are present in this new method: it deals with
different types of scales without the need of converting them into a single unit; it is able to cope
with the imperfect knowledge of data and arbitrariness when building the criteria; it takes into
account the reasons for and against an outranking; and, it avoids the compensatory phenomenon
in a systematic way. In addition, the method is able to provide a score range for each action, which,
before was considered a weak point of Electre methods.
Future research lines, start from software development and real-work applications. They include
also several extensions, as for example,
• the design of a hierarchical Electre-Score method, as in Corrente et al. (2013, 2016) and
Del Vasto-Terrientes et al. (2015), allowing in our case to give ranges of scores for different
macrocriteria in the hierarchical trees of criteria;
• the application of Monte-Carlo based pseudo-robustness analysis in the same line as in
Corrente et al. (2017) to provide more accurate score ranges;
• the use of robust ordinal techniques and other robustness techniques in the same line of
Greco et al. (2011) and Kadzin´ski and Ciomek (2016);
• the development evolutionary approaches for making the computations when in presence of
large sets of data as in Doumpos et al. (2009).
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A. Appendix
In this Appendix we will present the main concepts and steps that lead to the construction of a
credibility degree, σ(a, b) for the pair of actions (a, b).
State-of-the art versions of Electre methods make use of the so-called pseudo-criterion model
(Figueira et al., 2016; Roy, 1996; Roy and Bouyssou, 1993; Roy and Vincke, 1984) when comparing
two actions, a and b, on criterion gj, from their performances, gj(a) and gj(b), respectively. This
model associates with each criterion function, gj(·), two threshold functions: an indifference thresh-
old function, denoted by qj(·), and a preference threshold function, denoted by pj(·). Assume that
gj is a criterion to be maximized and that the performance gj(a) is better than the performance
gj(b). The threshold functions or simply thresholds can be constant or may vary in a direct way,
i.e., with respect to the worst performance, qj(gj(b)) and pj(gj(b)), or in an inverse way, i.e., with
respect to the best performance, qj(gj(a)) and pj(gj(a)). For the sake of simplicity and without
loss of generality, we consider in what follows that the thresholds are constant and use the simple
notation qj and pj, for the indifference and preference thresholds, respectively.
It is very important to note that the main purpose of these thresholds is not to model the
preferences, but rather the imperfect knowledge of data as it can be seen in Roy et al. (2014).
The choice of a pseudo-criterion model for the comparison of two actions, a and b, from their
performances on criterion gj , leads to the definition of three per -criterion binary relations, as
follows.
– A per-criterion indifference binary relation, which is used to model a situation in which a is
indifferent to b on criterion gj , denoted by a ∼j b; this occurs whenever |(gj(a)− gj(b))| 6 qj.
In other words, a situation where no one of the two actions, a and b, has a significant advantage
over the other on the considered criterion. Let C(a ∼ b) denote the set or coalition of criteria
for which a is indifferent to b.
– A per-criterion strict preference binary relation, which is used to model a situation in which
a is strictly preferred to b on criterion gj , denoted by a ≻j b; this occurs whenever (gj(a) −
gj(b)) > pj. In other words, a situation where action a has a significant advantage over b on
the considered criterion. Let C(a ≻ b) denote the set or coalition of criteria for which a is
strictly preferred to b.
– A per-criterion weak preference binary relation, which is used to model hesitation situations
of a with respect to b on criterion gj , denoted by a %
?
j b; this occurs whenever qj < (gj(a)−
gj(b)) 6 pj . In other words, a situation where there is an ambiguity zone between indifference
and strict preference of a over b on the considered criterion. Let C(a %? b) denote the set or
coalition of criteria for which a is weakly preferred to b. Note that the word weak has nothing
to do with intensities of preferences, it models hesitation or ambiguity (due to the imperfect
knowledge of data), not preferences.
Whenever a is indifferent, weak, or strict preferred to b, on criterion gj , we say that “a outranks
b” since a is at least as good as b in a stricto sensu on this criterion. This situation thus occurs,
when a ∼j b, a ≻j b, or a %
?
j b, and can be denoted by a %j b. In a more lato sensu we can also say
that “a outranks b” when b %?j a since there is hesitation between b ∼j a and b ≻j a on criterion
gj .
As all outranking based methods, Electremethods also make use of the per -criterion outrank-
ing relations to build one or several comprehensive outranking relations. In the method proposed
in this paper only one comprehensive outranking relation is considered, which allows to conclude
whether or not “a comprehensively outranks b”, denoted by a % b. More precisely, to conclude
about the assertion “a outranks b”, the strength of the coalition in its favor of should be powerful
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enough to overcome the opposition effect of the coalition against this assertion. How should the
power of the coalition in favor (or concordant with the assertion) and the effects of the coalition
against (or discordant with the assertion) be measured? To model the power of the concordant
coalition is modeled and measured in Electre methods through what is called in these methods
a comprehensive concordance index, while the opposition effect of each criterion is modeled and
measured to what is called a per-criterion discordance index. Both will be combined to devise a
credibility (outranking) index for each ordered pair of alternatives, (a, b) ∈ A × A. Next, we will
present the three main steps to obtain the credibility index.
1. Computing the comprehensive concordance index c(a, b). Again, for the sake of simplicity, the
formula we present next, for this index, is the classical one as in Roy and Bouyssou (1993). A
more sophisticated and recent version of the concordance index, which takes into account the
interaction between criteria can also be used in this context (see Figueira et al., 2009) with
no additional changes in the method proposed in this paper. As said before the concordance
index is used for measuring the power of the concordant coalition, where each criterion gj
contributes with its relative importance coefficient or weigh, wj, for j = 1, . . . , n (we assume
w.l.o.g. that
∑n
j=1wj = 1). The formula for the index can thus be stated as follows.
c(a, b) =
∑
C(a{∼,%?,≻}b)
wj +
∑
C(b%?a)
ϕjwj ,
where
ϕ =
(gj(a)− gj(b)) + pj
pj − qj
∈ [0, 1].
This means that if a criterion gj belongs to the concordant coalition stricto sensu, i.e., gj ∈
C(a{∼,%?,≻}b its contribution to the coalition power corresponds to its total weight, wj,
but if this criterion belongs to C(b %? a) it only contributes with a fraction of its weight,
ϕjwj .
2. Computing the per-criterion discordance indices dj(a, b), j = 1, . . . , n. To model the opposi-
tion effect of each criterion against the concordant coalition lato sensu, i.e., when gj ∈ C(b ≻
a), it is necessary to introduce another concept and preference parameter, the veto threshold
vj(·). This threshold can also be constant or vary in a direct or indirect way as in case of
indifference and preference thresholds. To render things simple and without loss of generality
we will keep its value constant, and denoted it simply by vj. A criterion gj is discordant with
the assertion “a outranks b”, when the difference of performances (gj(b)−gj(a)) is considered
significantly large to validate such an assertion. The more or less degree of discordance of
each criterion can be measured through a per -criterion discordance index of the form,
dj(a, b) =


1 if vj > (gj(a)− gj(b))
(gj(a)− gj(b)) + pj
pj − vj
if −vj 6 (gj(a)− gj(b)) < −pj
0 if (gj(a)− gj(b)) > −pj
3. Computing the credibility index σ(a, b). This index measures the credibility degree of the
outranking relation, i.e., the degree in which a outranks b. It can be modeled though the
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following formula.
σ(a, b) = c(a, b)
n∏
j=1
Tj(a, b),
where
Tj(a, b) =


1− dj(a, b)
1− c(a, b)
if gj(a, b) > c(a, b)
1 otherwise
It is thus a fuzzy measure. It can be converted into a crispy by making use of a cutting-off
level, denote by λ as in Section 2.
For the main features, advantages, and drawbacks of Electre the reader can refer to Figueira et al.
(2013).
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